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REGULATION OF MOTOR
TRANSPORTATION
I TRANSPORTATION HISTORY
The economist knows no more fascinating study than
the history and influence of transportation. Before man
had identified himself on this earth, a vast tonnage had
been brought together to form it. The hemispheres had
moved northward from their South Pole point of origin,
mountains had been leveled and deep valleys filled by
water and glacier, the bird and the beaver moved the
materials for new homes, and the tiniest wind-borne seeds
floated silently from one place to another. There was even
a considerable passenger business among the kangaroos and
certain early anthropoids.
Among the differences between human and other
animals is the greater power of man to improve the existing status. It did not take him long to discover that wood
and certain other materials would not only float, but would
support materials which would not float. He found that
the principle of the lever was of the greatest help to him
in lifting heavy weights and, perhaps most important of all,
he one day awakened to the fact that a roller or wheel
tremendously lightened the labor of moving his wife's
neolithic furniture.
Thus transportation, having begun long before man,
has been steadily developed and improved by him to the
present day. It has been one of the vital factors in the
upswing of civilization. Raw materials, fuel and markets
are all important, but transportation is the single factor involved in them all. We shall pass over the story of the
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human burden bearer, the pack horse, canoe, canal boat,
conestoga wagon, and the pony express. All had their
glorious day, but the people and goods of this country no
longer move by them.
II THE TRANSPORTATION SITUATION
We now find that the important agencies involved in
transportation are ship lines, railroads, electric lines and
motor vehicles. Air service undoubtedly is coming, but it
will be of more concern to the future than the present.
The development of all of these, including air lines, has
rather crowded the transportation field. We now find
them all competing to a certain extent, and some of them a
bit irritated by the process. It is our purpose to discuss
motor transportation, and to digress into the other fields
only far enough to learn something of the nature of the
transportation world in which this infant industry has suddenly found itself.
Steamships have been increased in size, speed and carrying power. Ports have been improved, and hundreds of
millions of both public and private dollars have been spent
in improving inland water ways. Many federal and state
laws have been enacted to regulate water-borne commerce,
the wages,hours and activities of those engaged in it. It
is no longer a free moral or immoral agent. It moves about
and has its being under a paternalistic government.
Railroads, for reasons which need not be discussed here,
have been placed under the closest kind of supervision.
They can do nothing, apparently, without the permission of
the Interstate Commerce Commission except pass dividends,
They have been told that they might go swimming, but they
must not go near the water. In these parlous times, they
are inclined to blame all troubles either on the Interstate
Commerce Commission or the motor vehicle. Passenger
business is falling off, tonnage is decreasing, revenues are
vanishing; even good temper, so necessary for the "iron
horse", has almost disappeared. Thousands of miles of
track are abandoned or useless. Station after station is be-
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ing closed up. Even a Coolidge Commission is sitting on
the railroads.
The electric lines, except in a very few instances, are
merely counting the days. These once popular and efficient public servants have been largely retired, either on
pension or without. We do not say that with proper care
electric transportation may not survive, but we think it must
have a different diet and a new nurse in most cases.
The motor vehicle bounces (as if on rubber) into this
transportation family, and with horns and rattles makes
itself quite unwelcome. At first, it is unregulated and unrestrained. It grows rapidly and wildly. It develops the
habit of taking what it wants, and is surprised to find that
people really want to give it to them. But often the people
do not know what is best for them, and very soon the various states try to quiet this youngster. They want it to grow
up and accept the conventional restrictions of maturity.
It must be more decorous, more considerate of its neighbors,
more restrained in its activities. Hence, every state (with
one exception) has undertaken to set up a rule of conduct
for the proper guidance, development and education of this
newcomer-the motor vehicle. What has Pennsylvania
done with this important subject?
III STATE REGULATION
It will clarify the situation if we say immediately that
we shall not discuss the so-called pleasure car, which is
subject only to police regulation and certain inspections, or
the taxi, which has been declared a common carrier in Pennsylvania. Neither shall we include that considerable number of special motor vehicles of all kinds. The motor bus
and motor truck alone offer sufficient problems for present
consideration.
The Act of July 26th, 1913, P. L. 1374, is known as the
Public Service Company Law. It became effective January
1st, 1914, since which date all common carriers of persons
and property in intrastate service in Pennsylvania have
been within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, which is the body created for the
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administration of this law. The Commission found the rail
and water lines well established, but transportation by bus
and truck was just beginning. In theory, at least, this industry has been regulated from the beginning--practically,
it was not of sufficient importance in 1914 to receive much
attention from the regulatory powers. The law, however,
was clear' and many later difficult situations would have
been avoided' if the early Commissions had recognized the
necessity for enforcing all the law.
Since the law quoted below does not differentiate between the bus and truck, and since the law covering the
requirements for obtaining the necessary certificates of
public convenience is the same for both, 2 one might assume
1

Act of July 26th, 1913, P. L. 1374.
"Section 2. Upon the approval of the commission evidenced by its
Certificate of Public Convenience, first had and obtained, and not otherwise, it shall be lawful for any proposed public service company(a). To be incorporated, organized, or created: Provided, That
existing laws relative to the incorporation, organization, and creation
of such companies shall first have been complied with, prior to the application to the commission for its Certificate of Public Convenience.
(b). To begin the exercise of any right, power, franchise, or
privilege, under any ordinance, municipal contract or otherwise.
Section 3. Upon like approval of the Commission first had and
obtained, as aforesaid, and upon compliance with existing laws, and not
otherwise, it shall be lawful(a). For any public service company to renew its charter, or obtain any additional rights, powers, franchises, or privileges, by any
amendment or supplement to its charter, or otherwise." Article III,
Sections 2 and 3.
The "public -service company" referred to is defined in Article I,
Section 1, as follows:
"The term 'Public Service Company', when used in this act, includes all * * * * common carriers, * * * * and also all persons engaged
for profit in the same kind of business within this Commonwealth."
A "common carrier" is described (not defined) as follows:
"The term Common Carrier', as used in this act, includes any and
all common carriers, whether corporations or persons, engaged for
profit in the conveyance of passengers or property, or both, between
points within this Commonwealth, by, through, over, above, or under
land or water, or both." Article I, Section 1.
?"Section 18. When application shall be made to the commission
by any proposed public service company for the approval by said com-
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that one general set of Commission regulations could be
devised to govern both. Unfortunately for the student of
the law, this assumption is not entirely correct. Partly
because bus regulation was undertaken first, but more because of essential differences in the services, much of the
system of regulation of the bus is different from that of the
truck. The Commission has issued separate general orders
for their governance.3 It is true that applications to the
Commission for certificates of public convenience are somewhat similar. The filing fee is the same, 4 the public notices
of hearings are advertised to the same extent, 5 but there are
some important matters peculiar to each which have no
relation to the other. Let us, therefore, look at some of the
regulatory problems of these agencies, with a glance later
at federal regulation of both.
Since most of the problems to be considered arise from
cases involving the question as to just what types of operation are subject to the provisions of the Public Service
Company Law, it would be well to indicate some services
which are outside of the Commission's jurisdiction. There
are three broad classes of operators who are within this
group:
1. Those engaged in interstate commerce.
mission of its incorporation, or organization, or creation; or by any
public service company for the approval by the commission of the renewal of its charter, or the obtaining of any additional rights, powers,
franchises, or privileges by any amendment or supplement to its charter,

or otherwise; or for permission from the commission to begin the exercise of any right, power, franchise, or privilege; * * * * such approval, in each and every such case, or kind of application, shall be given

only if and when the said commission shall find or determine that the
granting or approval of such application is necessary or proper for the

service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public."
V, Section 18, 1913 P. L. 1374.
3

Article

General Order No. 18, as amended, applies to motor bus opera-

tion.
General Order No. 29 (effective January 1st, 1933)

applies to

motor truck operation.
'$5.00 for each application.
5Once each week for two consecutive weeks in newspapers of
general circulation in the territory to be served.
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2. Those who operated prior to January 1st,
1914, the effective date of the Public Service Company
Law, and have continuously engaged in such operations since that date.
3.

Private or "contract" carriers, as distinguished

from common carriers.
The question as to whether or not certain types of
activities are within these exceptions has been productive
of many perplexing and interesting situations. Space
limitations prohibit adequate discussions of all of these, and
consequently only the more interesting adjudicated and
pending problems will be considered in the following pages.
IV SOME PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN STATE REGULATION
(a)

Those affecting both bus and truck operations

The cases involving the first two categories of carriers
(those engaged in interstate commerce and those who operated prior to 1914) who are free from the jurisdiction of
the Commission are similar, whether buses or trucks are
involved. The principles of regulation apply generally
with equal force to the operations of both forms of transportation. These principles will, therefore, be considered
without segregating them as to the carriage of persons or
property. On the other hand, the problems arising under
the third group (contract or private carriers) so often differ
in the factual situations which they develop that it seems
better to discuss separately the bus and truck cases involved
in this group.
The United States Supreme Court, in the famous Bush
and Buck cases, 6 made it clear that interstate commerce by
motor vehicle could not be burdened by state regulation.
These cases have been followed by others,, some of which
at first glance seem to modify the Bush and Buck cases but,
upon more careful study, will be found merely to reiterate
(Bush v. Maloy. 267 U. S. 317; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307.
7Nevin Bus Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 99 Pa. Super.
Ct. 370; Garrison v. Paramount Bus Corporation, 227 N. Y. Sup. 511;
and cases cited in next note.
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the principle that the police power of the state may be
exercised to reasonably restrict speed, weight and size, and
regulate actual highway operation.8 An Ohio case even
upholds a Commission ruling which prohibited interstate
commerce on certain highways, because of existing congestion thereon, probably on the theory of promotion of public
safety. 9
As we have said, it is established law that interstate
commerce cannot be unduly burdened by any state or state
agency, but this is another of those many occasions where
a statement of the law does not adequately cover the situation. One immediately asks for a definition of interstate
commerce, so that he may know what it is which cannot be
unreasonably burdened. Much transportation may be immediately classified as interstate. Any bona fide transportation between two or more states may be safely called
interstate, but there are many interesting cases which are
not so clear.
The earlier cases nearly all involved railroads, and
since the railroads were then interested (to avoid a complication of compensation, liability, or other state laws) in
including as much as possible in interstate service, they continuously and effectively urged upon the various commissions and the courts the broadening of the definition of
interstate commerce, and undoubtedly aided in formulating
the general policies laid down in the decisions.. The case
8

See for example Morris v. Duby, 274 U. S. 135; Inter-State Buses
Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U, S. 245; Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, in the case of Schwartzman Service, Inc. v. Milton R. Stahl
et al., 60 F. (2d.) 1034, in which the constitutionality of a Missouri
regulatory statute was in question, declared that the state could impose
regulations concerning the safe condition of vehicles, the licensing of
competent operators, reporting of accidents, proper identification of
vehicles, and general safety of operations, including speed limits, sizes,

weights, etc. Such regulation, under the Missouri decision, is not considered an interference with interstate commerce.
QBradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (report not yet
published). An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court,

this Court having consented to take probable jurisdiction on November
7th, 1932. (Appeal No. 395).
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quoted below,10 while possibly not a leading case, is one of
the clearest on the subject. During the earlier litigation, the
railroads strongly opposed the application to bus operations
of the principles laid down in the Yohn case (cited below).
They said that the crossing of state lines by railroad was
quite different from crossing a state line by highway. The
rail line was more permanent, the train must move over it,
and its right of way was never determined with reference
to the location of state lines. The bus might move over any
highway and might deliberately select one which crossed a
state line, for the purpose of making the operation interstate. The courts and commissions have not recognized
the "permanency" of the right of way as a controlling
factor, although moving across a state line as a subterfuge
is prohibited. (Subterfuge will be discussed later.) We
find that the New York courts have applied to bus lines the
same rule as governs rail lines"i but not all states have
done this. A broader view of the question may be had by
a study of cases not directly involving rail service.' 2
10"It is contended on defendant's behalf that the shipment was not
of an interstate character, because the point of origin and the point of
destination were in the same state. The contention is untenable. Intrastate commerce is that commerce which is during its whole course of
transportation within the jurisdiction of a single state. Commerce which
originates in a state, passes into another, and then returns to the first,
is interstate, as it has gone beyond the state in which it originated, and
then passed back again into it, and so has become subject to different
jurisdictions in the course of its transportation. Neither state is able
to protect it during the whole period of its transportation, and this fact

makes federal control practically necessary, as well as legally possible."

Yohn v. United States, 279 Fed. 562.
"'A bus line whose route begins and ends in one state, but between these termini passes through another state, is an interstate carrier. State statutes, which require a certificate of convenience and

necessity and the consent of local authorities for intrastate lines, do not
apply to it." Garrison v. Paramount Bus Corporation, 227 N. Y. Sup.
511.
12Transportation of stolen automobile-U. S. v. Winkler, 299 Fed.

832; Hughes v. United States, 4 Fed. 387; transportation by ferryMayor and Board of Aldermen of Town of Vidalia v. McNeeley, 274
U. S. 576: telegraph and telephone messages-Western Union Tele-

graph Co. v. Addie Speight, 254 U. S. 1765; driving or wandering of

cattle across state lines-Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S. 414.
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In Pennsylvania, the rule is that service between two
points within the state is interstate, if it is rendered over a
route traversing another state and such route has not been
chosen as a subterfuge to avoid the law. The Public Service Commission has decided that transportation from Pittsburgh and other points in Pennsylvania to Camden, New
Jersey, where the obvious intent of the passenger was to
return immediately to Philadelphia, was intrastate commerce, even though the bus carried the passenger into New
Jersey, because such carrying was a subterfuge only.' 3 It
has also held that transportation between Pittsburgh and
Philadelphia via Emmitsburg, Maryland, was intrastate
commerce, it being apparent, to the satisfaction of the Commission, that the short divergence over the Emmitsburg
road into Maryland was merely a subterfuge for the pur14
pose of avoiding the law.

On the other hand, the Commission has held that transportation of passengers between Scranton and Philadelphia
was interstate commerce where the bus operated over fifteen
to eighteen miles of New Jersey highway, and where it was
shown that this highway was shorter and in much better
physical condition. Evidence involved in the case was
testimony of transportation experts that the Jersey route
was the better, and the introduction of a number of comparative photographs of the Jersey highway and the nearest
practicable highway in Pennsylvania. These were rather
conclusive evidence that the Jersey highway was preferable.
Subterfuge, therefore, could not be established, and the
Commission followed the railroad rule in declaring such
service to be interstate." A similar conclusion was reached
as to transportation between Pittsburgh and Philadelphia,
via Wilmington, Delaware, in which case it was shown
that the company had a substantial amount ot, business to
'aPublic Service Commission v. Highway Motor Coach Co., 8 Pa.
P. S. C. 402; see also Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad
Co. v. Frank Martz Bus Co., 9 Pa. P. S. C. 647.
14Penna, Railroad Co. v.- Nevin Bus Lines, 9 Pa, P. S. C. 723.
'5Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. et al. v. Great

Lakes Stages, Inc., 10 Pa. P. S. C. 565.
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and from Wilmington, and there were reasonable grounds
to presume that the Wilmington route was chosen because
of its desirability as an operating route, and not merely as a
subterfuge. 16
It has been held in Pennsylvania that the intention of
the passenger, as communicated to the company or its agent,
is a vital factor in determining whether or not the transportation is interstate. If a person should walk into the
office of a Harrisburg bus company operating to Elmira, and
ask for a ticket to Williamsport, the fact that the bus company sold him a ticket to Elmira and permitted him to get
off at Williamsport would not make the transportation interstate. The knowledge of the company that the prospective
passenger proposed an intrastate journey would make the
transportation intrastate, regardless of the ticket destination.
The intention of the passenger, however, not communicated
to the company, as, for example, if the same passenger had
walked into the Harrisburg office and asked for a ticket to
Elmira, would not involve the company in intrastate transportation, even though the passenger discontinued his
journey at Williamsport. When we say the companr
would not be "involved" in intrastate transportation, we
mean that the Commission would not consider it guilty of
any offense, even though technically the trip was intrastate. 7
Another class of common carrier motor vehicle operations not within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission includes those persons or companies who operated
before January 1st, 1914 (the effective date of the Public
Service Company Law). The law is not retroactive, and
16Pemia. General Transit Co. v. Great Eastern Stages, Inc., 11 Pa.
P. S. C. 27. See also Lehigh Valley Transit Co. v. Quaker City Motor
Coach Lines, Inc., 10 Pa. P. S. C. 539; and Delaware, Lackawanna and
Western Railroad Co. v. Frank Martz Coach Co., 10 Pa. P. S. C. 560.
"7See generally Penna. Railroad Co. v. Colonial Stages, 10 Pa. P.
S. C. 170; and Fullington Auto Bus Co. v. Edwards Motor Transit Co.,
10 Pa. P. S. C. 687, in which the Commission decided that tickets between points in different states were sold merely as subterfuge, when
the intention of the passenger to make an intrastate journey was known
to the agent of the carrier.
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one engaged as a common carrier by bus or truck in Pennsylvania before 1914, and continuously since, may now
legally render service of the same character and to the same
extent as was rendered before the effective date of the Act.",
This rule is strictly construed, however, as to the type and
extent of the service and the identity of the operator. The
Commission and the Courts have consistently held that a
public service company which operated prior to 1914 is
entitled (but not required) to be registered to continue the
service theretofore rendered, but only to the extent that the
rights and powers possessed before 1914 were actually used
and employed. 19 One who operated one motor vehicle as
a common carrier, either of passengers or freight, before
1914, may not now use two or more such vehicles. 20 If he
operated a call and demand service, he may not now operate a scheduled service. If he served a certain limited territory, that is no justification for extending his service. The
operator of horse-drawn vehicles in a livery service before
the effective date of the Act may not now legally operate
buses, even though he says that he will hire them out in
the same way as he did horses. 2 ' If the service was dis18Article III, Section 12 of the Public Service Company Law provides that"Every public service company shall be entitled to the full enjoyment and exercise of all and every, the rights, powers, and privileges
which it lawfully possesses, or might possess, at the time of the passage
of this Act * * * * ."
19City Transfer Company v. Public Service Commission, 93 Pa.
Super. Ct. 210; Coplay Cement Mfg. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 271
Pa. 55; Peoples Natural Gas Company v. Public Service Commission,
279 Pa. 252; Wilkes-Barre Railway Corporation v. Lawrence C. Hartman, 6 Pa. P. S. C. 362; Edwards Motor Transit Co. v. Burns, 8 Pa.
P. S. C. 693; Wayne Automobile Transportation Co. v. Harder, 8 Pa.
P. S. C. 256. The earlier case of Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp. v.
Pugh, 6 Pa. Corp. Rep. 141, which was much more liberal, has been
overruled. Pittsburgh Transportation Co. v. Yellow Cab Co., 9 Pa.
P. S. C. 435.
2
Application of Keystone Express and Storage Company, Application Docket No. 400.46 for 1932. This ruling has been appealed to the
Superior Court but has not yet been argued.
21L-wards Motor Transit Co. v. Burns, 8 Pa. P. S. C. 693.
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continued for an appreciable period after 1914, it may not
again be rendered without a certificate from the Commission. The rule as to the identity of the operator does not
permit any substitution. If the original operator has died
since 1914, or if an original partnership has since been dissolved, or if the business has been incorporated or a new
partnership organized, or any other change has been made
in the identity of the operator, the Public Service Commission says that a certificate of public convenience must be
obtained before the service may be continued. For the
purpose of showing the extent of the service rendered before the date of the Act, and of proving to the Commission
the right to continue its operation, applications may be filed
with the Commission for the registration (not certification)
of the operator. It is not necessary to prove any public
necessity or demand in such cases, but it is necessary to
prove completely the type and extent of service and the
identity of the operator as each existed before January 1st,
1914.
(b)

Problems peculiar to bus operations.

The status of the school bus has baffled the Commission in a number of perplexing cases. Of the 98,900 buses
in operation in the United States, approximately 48,50022
are school buses; that is, engaged in the transportation of
school children. Whether or not such buses are engaged
in common carriage is a problem susceptible of diverse
solutions. It is held that where the transportation is done
under a contract between the bus operator and the school
board or district, the operator is a private contract carrier
rather than a common carrier and, therefore, need not obtain a certificate of public convenience. 3 On the other
hand, if the fare is paid by each passenger student, rather
than by the school board, the operator is a common carrier
and subject to regulation. The Commission has held that
22

Bus Facts for 1932, published by National Association of Motor
Bus Operators.
23Huffman

and Patton v. James Rue, 6 Pa. P. S. C. 682.
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the carriage of many groups of school children is common
carriage even though the children are transported under
2
terms of contracts made with the school boards. 4
Many bus operators who have certificates of public
convenience have attempted to bid on school contracts, but
the Court and Commission decisions in effect practically
preclude them from obtaining such business. They cannot
justify such carriage on the ground that it is conducted
under a private contract, because one may not be both a
common and private carrier.2 5 Since school districts must
take public bids for transportation service, certificated bus
owners are at a tremendous disadvantage. Their rates are
on file, and they can legally bid only the filed rate. Their
competitors, having easy access to these rates, can bid a few
cents less than those filed by the common carriers and obtain
the business.
Buses owned by hotel companies, and operating between the owner's place of business and railroad stations,
have not been regarded as common carriers, even if a
charge is made for the service and all patrons of the hotel
are transported indiscriminately. 2 Where one undertakes
to carry his fellow workers with him to the mine or factory,
and to return them to their homes, for a fixed amount per
week, he is a common carrier.2 7 This is true even if he
makes no fixed charge but does accept gratuities for the service, such as contributions of money2 8 or, presumably, any2

'Application of P. R. T., 10 Pa. P. S. C. 740.
25Specifically, Beach v. Renn, 10 Pa. P. S. C. 223. Generally,
York Motor Express Co. v. Public Service Commission, 96 Pa. Super, Ct.
174; Lehigh Valley Transit Co. v. Nase, 10 Pa. P. S. C. 55; Traction
Bus Co. v. Somerset Bus Co., 9 Pa. P. S. C. 743.
26
Expressions of authorities not stated in formal opinions.
2
7Carrick-Bruceton Consolidated Bus Line v. Zupanic, 9 Pa. P. S.
C. 665; Wayne Transportation Co. v. Leopold et al., 6 Pa. P. S. C.
575. See also Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp. v. Hartman, 7 Pa. P. S. C.
228-bus service rendered under contract with an industry for daily
transportation of employees held common carriage.
28
York Railways Co. v. Longstreet, 6 Pa. P. S. C. 711 (this very
interesting case holding that service rendered in the guise of a "community bus" was really common carriage); Lehigh Valley Transit Co.
v. Bauder et al., 5 Pa. P. S. C. 309.
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thing of value. This rule does not apply, however, to group
ownership of a vehicle used for the benefit of all the owners.
A group of men working at the same place became joint
purchasers of a bus in which they all rode to work and back
to their homes. This was held not to be common carriage,
inasmuch as they did not transport anyone who was not a
part owner..2 9 You may, if you wish, speculate as to
whether such owners must all have equal shares, or whether
one specially interested might own 99.44% of it and be
paid for driving. One also wonders what might happen in
the case of stockholders in a corporation which owned one
or more buses. Are they such joint owners as would take
the operation of the corporation's bus out of the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and permit it to compete for the business of established lines? An interesting experiment is now being undertaken in the Pittsburgh district. A
corporation has been created to purchase and operate certain
buses. Local community associations are then formed, with
an entrance fee and dues for members. These associations
have agreements with the operating company for the transportation of their members, without direct charge to the
passenger. Is such an undertaking within the jurisdiction
of the Public Service Commission, and can it be prohibited
by it? The operators think not. It seems apparent, however, that the whole scheme was devised for the purpose of
avoiding the law, and that very purpose may bring it within the law. It seems to be settled in Pennsylvania that
transportation performed under any circumstances which
amount to a subterfuge for the purpose of evading the law,
does not thereby escape regulation."
We should not as
yet want to sell tires on a mileage basis to the Pittsburgh
experimentors. If the reader desires to park off the main
highway for a bit, he may engage his mind with the
problem of what to do with four men who all work at the
same place and each own an automobile. Finding under
2 Expressions of authorities not stated in formal opinions.
?OSee York Railways Co. v. Longstreet, supra, note 28; Lehigh
Valley Transit Co. v. Bauder et al., supra; Jacob Creek Ferry Co. v.

Williams, 10 Pa. P. S. C. 765.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the decisions quoted that they cannot pay one of their number to transport them, and being determined not to run four
cars to the plant each day, they decide that each will use
his car for one week and transport the others free of any
charge. Are all or any of them common carriers? The
Commission has said they are not.3' A high school stiident
who carried three other students to school on written agreements for a certain sum per week, and who did not hold
himself out as willing to carry all who might apply, was also
32
held not to be a common carrier.

And so particular and specific problems might be indefinitely multiplied. The controlling principle, however,
is whether or not the operator is a common carrier. Determining this question is frequently quite difficult, but it is
vitally important, not only to the Commission, but to the
lawyer who must advise his client whether or not he is
violating the law by operating without a certificate of public
convenience. The so-called definition of a common carrier
in the law itself is of little use, as it does not define. 83
Actual experience or a thorough study of the cases, or both,
are necessary if the right conclusion is to be reached.
(c)

Problems peculiar to truck operations.

When we consider the transportation of property by
motor truck as distinct from the transportation of passengers, we find a few interesting situations. It appears that
a warehouseman, in the business of accepting and storing
general merchandise consigned to the warehouse for delivery to later designated consignees, as directed by the
owner of the goods, may deliver such goods upon order as
have been stored with him, as an incident to his warehousing business, without a certificate of public convenience.
"One who receives goods under contract, the main object of
which is storage, is a warehouseman; nor is he transformed
into a common carrier by reason of his undertaking to trans31Shaw v. Smith et
32Somerset Bus Co.
83

See note 1.

al., 7 Pa. P. S. C. 59.
v. Snyder, 8 Pa. P. S. C. 787.
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port the goods to his warehouse or to forward the goods by
direction of the owner." (40 Cyc. 401) It has been the
practice all over Pennsylvania for warehouse operators to
do this, and while no specific complaint has been before the
Commission which would provide a clear-cut decision, the
Commission has indirectly recognized the legality of such
transportation. The Johnstown Terminal Storage Company was making such deliveries to a number of places, including Altoona. When a subsidiary applied for the right
to render a common carrier service over a considerable
territory, a restriction was placed in its certificate against
transporting merchandise between Johnstown and Altoona,
on the ground that there was sufficient service between
those points, but it was permitted to transport from Johnstown to Altoona such merchandise as had been stored in the
Johnstown Terminal Storage Company, the parent company. This seems to have been done in recognition of the
right of the warehouse company to render this service with34
cut certificate.
It would, of course, be unlawful to have goods shipped
to a warehouse for delivery to an original consignee as a
subterfuge. Merchandise billed from Pittsburgh to Altoona, if such shipment were otherwise prohibited by law,
could not be made legal by detaining it a day or so in a
warehouse in Johnstown. The bulk of the goods in warehouses, however, are shipped either to the warehouse or to
the consignor, and are stored there for delivery to particular
consignees when and if sold to them.
The local draymen are practically all common carriers
and should secure certificates to operate in call and demand
service. It appears that such a drayman delivering the
goods of one person only to a large number of receivers is
not a common carrier. Any merchant might contract with
341n tWe application of Montgomery and Co. (Application Docket
24361-1932). the Commission seems to hold that such operations are

common carriage.

The order (handed down on Sept. 27th, 1932) pro-

vides that the applicant may transport within a prescribed distance
freight "'received at Harrisburg by rail and assigned to the certificate
holder for storage or distribution."

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
a trucker to make all of its deliveries, and such trucker
would not be a common carrier. In the Keystone Warehousing case,3 4 * however, the Commission determined that
one engaged in the business of delivering packages for
retail merchants, from their stores to surrounding towns,
and who solicited such business generally, was a common
carrier. There is a considerable difference of opinion as to
whether or not a railroad may make a single contract with
a trucker to deliver all of its merchandise and not thereby
make the trucker a common carrier. You will immediately
observe that in one case all of the goods come from one
shipper, while in the railroad case all of the goods are
delivered to the trucker by one entity, but the transportation began with shipments from a large number of different
consignors. In such case, the the railroad might be merely
a forwarder by motor truck, and the trucker, carrying for
one shipper only, not be a common carrier. We shall discuss forwarders more in detail later. Where one transports for an organization comprised of a large number of
dealers, under an arrangement whereby he hauls the produce and merchandise of its members for mutual advantage,
he is a common carrier and must obtain a certificate of
public convenience, or desist from carrying, 5 The same
conclusion was reached where one hauled freight from a
freight receiving station only for the members of a "Community Business Men's Association. 8- 6
Another difficult problem arises where, for example, a
large department store makes deliveries "free" to its customers. Everyon& knows that such deliveries are not free,
that they must be charged for in the value of the goods, but
under the statutes taxing the gross receipts of carriers for
hire these companies have been exempt, on the theory that
there was no separate and distinct charge for transportation. The same company, however, which delivers much
of its goods without a separate charge, may charge for delivery to all points beyond a fixed limit. This company
36*161 At. 891 (Pa. Super. Ct.).
"Henneous v. Henneous, 6 Pa. P. S. C. 505.
B6Pennsylvania Railroad Co. et al. v. Robinson, 10 Pa. P. S,C. 198.
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then becomes an operator for hire as to these points. In
the cases where a charge is made, if the title to the goods
is in the purchaser before they leave the store, it may be
that such service, being for a large number of persons and
for a remuneration, constitutes the operator a common carrier. We know of no case in which this question has been
answered, but submit it as one of the many involved problems still facing the regulatory authorities.
Another class of cases which has produced considerable insomnia is that involving so-called forwarders. There
is such a thing as a forwarder pure and simple, who is not
a common carrier.3 7 They do not have a part in the transportation, have no interest in the goods nor the conveyance which carries them, and act really as agents for the
shipper. Most of the cases concerning forwarders have
to do with their liability, which is, of course, greater if they
are common carriers. In practically all of these cases, a
common carrier is involved somewhere in the transportation.
The forwarder ships by rail or by boat, and is regarded
as a shipper. With the development of the motor truck industry, there have grown up a considerable number of socalled forwarders, who solicit the business of various
shippers and transport the merchandise to its ultimate
destination by uncertificated motor trucks. These agencies
carry insurance on the cargo and are responsible for delivery to the ultimate consignee. They issue a paper, which
may be called a bill of lading or waybill, but which indicates
the character of the goods, the charge made for the shipment, its point of origin and destination, These operators
claim that they are not common carriers, that they are the
3710 C. J. 50, Par. 27, note 45; 4 R. C. L. 550.

The forwarder by

rail collects from various shippers small lots of goods, sufficient to constitute a carload. The forwarder then ships the car at the carload rate,
thereby saving the difference between this rate and the less-than-carload
rate. The forwarder is able to get a fair compensation and to save
money for the shippers. See Great Northern Railroad Co. v. O'Connor, 232 U. S. 508. When these so-called "forwarders" exercise certain control over the shipment, they are held to be common carriers.
Kettenhofen v. Globe Transfer & Storage Co., 127 Pat. (Wash.) 295,
excellently annotated in 42 L. R. A, (N. S.) 902.
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agents of the shipper, and that they come within the class
known as forwarding merchants, who have long been recognized in connection with railroad transportation. If their
contention is correct, they may operate as an unregulated
group.,
In the leading case of Alko Express Lines v. Highway
8 the Commission held that
FreightForwardingCorporation,"
such companies are common carriers. This case is now on appeal to the Superior Court,89 has been briefed and argued,
and decision may be expected shortly. It will readily be
seen that, if this operator is not a common carrier, and if
the trucker who transports the goods does so only for that
particular operator, and is, therefore, not a common carrier,
very great tonnage may be shipped from a large number
of consignors to a large number of consignees in any number of different towns or cities, and no common cariiage
whatever would be involved. This situation will, of course,
cause very considerable confusion in transportation circles
if the appellate courts should find that the service may be
rendered without any regulation, on the theory that no
common carriage is involved.

V. FEDERAL REGULATION
With the constantly expanding service rendered by
the motor bus and motor truck, the discovery that its
economic service limit may be one, two or three hundred
miles instead of twenty-five to fifty miles, as at first supposed, and with the constantly increasing burdens and restrictions placed upon intrastate operators, interstate operation is growing rapidly. There is a large volume of bona
fide interstate business and a considerable amount of what
might be called "legal" interstate business (being shipments between two points in the same state by way of
another state). The Bush and Buck decisions hereinbefore
referred to make it quite clear that there is no existing
agency to regulate any of this interstate business when done
by motor vehicle.
asComplaint Docket No. 9112-1932.
89337 October Term, 1932 (Philadelphia District).
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For some years, a large number of bus and truck interests, as well as rail interests, have been trying to secure
a federal statute regulating such service. The Interstate
Commerce Committees of both the United States Senate
and House of Representatives have given a great deal of
study to the problem. The Interstate Commerce Commission has held hearings all over the country to determine
to what extent, if any, interstate common carriage by motor
vehicles should be regulated. Everyone except the free
lance"0 operator seems to agree that some regulation should
be undertaken. Its nature and extent, however, have not
been determined definitely. A number of bills have been
introduced in Congress, many hearings have been held before the Interstate Commerce Committees, a great number
of conferences have been held by rail, bus and truck interests, hundreds of resolutions have been passed by various
organizations concerned, but as yet there is no statute providing for regulation of interstate commerce by motor
vehicle. Undoubtedly we are nearer to such regulation,
and very strong pressure will be brought upon Congress to
provide for it at the present regular session. It is an error,
however, to charge, as is frequently done in the newspapers, that the bus and truck interests have opposed such
regulation. The bus interests have long been active in
favor of it. Many of the truck operators are also in favor
of regulation, although this industry has not been organized
nationally and has not made its voice heard as directly as
has the bus business.
It is scarcely necessary, in closing, to remind you that
any one of the various important problems involved in
motor bus and motor truck regulation might well be the
subject of a much more detailed discussion than this one.
This article merely attempts to cover in a sketchy fashion
some of the more important present elements of governmental regulation, restriction and prohibition, as applied
to the common carrier motor bus and truck.
STERLING G. McNEES
Harrisburg, Pa.
4OAlso known to truckers as the "bootlegger" or "cut-throat", since
hauls
what he pleases and cuts or raises rates to suit his convenience.
he

